

Safe Types in Untyped Contexts

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Gradual types = **Static** types + **any**

$t \leq \text{any}$ $\text{any} \leq t'$

Strong reject!

$$\frac{t \leq \text{any} \quad \text{any} \leq t'}{t \leq t'}$$

Transitivity is key to subtyping

Subtyping models data flow

Strong accept!

$$\frac{t \leq \text{any} \quad \text{any} \leq t'}{t \leq t'}$$

public

$$\frac{t \leq \text{any} \quad \text{any} \leq t'}{t \leq t'}$$

tainted

Gradual types = Security* types!

Syntactic separation of types / safety


$$\tau ::= \iota \mid t \rightarrow t' \mid \{\ell_1 : t_1, \dots, \ell_n : t_n\} \mid \& t$$
$$t ::= \tau \# \theta \mid \text{any}$$

“Safety qualifiers”

$\theta ::= \mathbf{src} \gg \mathbf{dst}$


Safety lattice

$$\frac{\mathbf{src}' \subseteq \mathbf{src} \quad \mathbf{dst} \subseteq \mathbf{dst}'}{\mathbf{src} \gg \mathbf{dst} \leq \mathbf{src}' \gg \mathbf{dst}'}$$



Precision lattice

$$\frac{\mathbf{src}' \subseteq \mathbf{src} \quad \mathbf{dst}' \subseteq \mathbf{dst}}{\mathbf{src} \gg \mathbf{dst} \sqsupseteq \mathbf{src}' \gg \mathbf{dst}'}$$





Types

$$\overline{l \leq l}$$

$$\frac{t'_1 \leq t_1 \quad t_2 \leq t'_2}{t_1 \rightarrow t_2 \leq t'_1 \rightarrow t'_2}$$

$$\frac{m \leq n \quad t_1 \leq t'_1 \quad \dots \quad t_m \leq t'_m}{\{\ell_1 : t_1, \dots, \ell_n : t_n\} \leq \{\ell_1 : t'_1, \dots, \ell_m : t'_m\}}$$

$$\frac{t' \leq t \quad t \leq t'}{\& t \leq \& t'}$$

Safety

$$\frac{\tau \leq \tau' \quad \theta \leq \theta'}{\tau \# \theta \leq \tau' \# \theta'}$$

$$\frac{}{\text{any} \leq \text{any}}$$

$$\frac{\theta \leq \mathbf{Dynamic}}{\text{public } \theta}$$

$$\frac{\mathbf{Dynamic} \leq \theta}{\text{tainted } \theta}$$

$$\frac{\text{public } \theta}{\tau \# \theta \leq \text{any}}$$

$$\frac{\text{tainted } \theta}{\text{any} \leq \tau \# \theta}$$

Type tags

$$l^\bullet = l$$

$$(t_1 \rightarrow t_2)^\bullet = \text{any} \rightarrow \text{any}$$

$$\{\ell_1 : t_1, \dots, \ell_n : t_n\}^\bullet = \{\ell_1 : \text{any}, \dots, \ell_n : \text{any}\}$$

$$(\& t)^\bullet = \& \text{any}$$

$$\frac{\tau \leq \tau^\bullet}{\text{public } \tau}$$

$$\frac{\tau^\bullet \leq \tau}{\text{tainted } \tau}$$

Well-formed types / safety

Hint: this is

the most important slide

in this talk!

public $\theta \Rightarrow$ public τ

tainted $\theta \Rightarrow$ tainted τ

Polarities

$$\overline{l^\dagger = \text{Dynamic}}$$

$$\overline{(t_1 \rightarrow t_2)^\dagger = (t_1^\dagger)^{-1} \sqcap t_2^\dagger}$$

$$\overline{\{\ell_1 : t_1, \dots, \ell_n : t_n\}^\dagger = t_1^\dagger \sqcap \dots \sqcap t_n^\dagger}$$

$$\overline{(\& t)^\dagger = (t^\dagger)^{-1} \sqcap t^\dagger}$$

$$\theta \sqsupseteq \tau^\dagger$$

$$\overline{\text{any}^\dagger = \text{Dynamic}}$$

$$\overline{(\tau \# \theta)^\dagger = \theta}$$

CAUTION



THIS IS SPARTA

$\frac{\text{public } \theta \quad \text{public } \tau}{\tau \# \theta \leq \text{any}}$

$\frac{\text{tainted } \theta \quad \text{tainted } \tau}{\text{any} \leq \tau \# \theta}$



$t_{\text{unsafe}} = \{\ell : (\& (\{\} \# \text{Initial})) \# \text{Initial}\} \# \text{Initial}$

Mutability + Subtyping = 

Well-formed = Sound

“I’ll be fine, thank you!”

$t_{\text{safe}(1)} = \{\ell : (\& (\{\} \# \text{Dynamic})) \# \text{Initial}\} \# \text{Initial}$

“Help me please!”

$t_{\text{safe}(2)} = \{\ell : (\& (\{\} \# \text{Initial})) \# \text{Initial}\} \# \text{Static}$

Applications

Well-typed programs can be optimized



Inference

$$\Gamma \vdash e : t \implies c$$

Dynamic checking

$$\Gamma \vdash e : \tau \uparrow c$$

Static checking

$$\Gamma \vdash e : t \Leftarrow c$$

Insert dynamic checks for tainted types...

$$\frac{\Gamma \vdash e : \text{any} \implies c}{\Gamma \vdash e : \tau^\bullet \uparrow \langle \tau^\bullet \rangle c}$$

$$\frac{\Gamma \vdash e : \tau \# \theta \implies c \quad \text{tainted } \theta}{\Gamma \vdash e : \tau \uparrow \langle \tau^\bullet \rangle c}$$

Remove dynamic checks for trusted types!

$$\frac{\Gamma \vdash e : \tau \# \theta \implies c \quad \text{trusted } \theta}{\Gamma \vdash e : \tau \uparrow c}$$

Also,

“subtyping models data flow”

$$\frac{\Gamma \vdash e : t' \Longrightarrow c \quad t' \leq t}{\Gamma \vdash e : t \Leftarrow c}$$

Well-typed programs can't be blamed



“Encouraging discovery!” 👍



“Disappointing reception” 👎

Safety

$t \leq t'$ iff $t \leq^+ t'$ and $t \leq^- t'$.

Precision

$t \sqsupseteq t'$ iff $t \leq^+ t'$ and $t' \leq^- t$



Symmetric rules, Asymmetric encoding

Tainted types = **any**

Trusted types = **Static** types

“IT’S NOT WHO I AM UNDERNEATH
BUT WHAT I DO THAT DEFINES ME”

