Verifying Cryptographic Web Applications

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Cryptographic Apps in JavaScript?



Each app embeds a crypto protocol for end-to-end security
Little or no reliance on a trusted server, all protections are in JavaScript

Crypto Web Application Architecture



Application Skype (React/Electron/Node)

Crypto Protocol Signal (JavaScript)

Crypto Library curve25519 (JS compiled from C) window.crypto (native C library)

Challenge: Verify the crypto library and protocol code and protect both from application bugs

HACL*: Verified Crypto in C and WASM



- Verified modern (+ upcoming) crypto primitives Chacha20, Poly1305, Curve25519, Ed25519, SHA-3, RSA-PSS, PQ crypto etc
- We prove correctness, memory safety, secret independence Open challenge: propagate side channel protections from WASM to assembly

Verifying crypto protocols in JavaScript



Methodology applied to Signal, TLS 1.3 Open challenge: formal guarantees for model extraction tools

Protecting Crypto from Application Bugs

- Write protocol and crypto in a "defensive" style Self-contained, no calls to application code or untrusted libraries Provide clean APIs that hide (most) secrets from application
- Write application in statically typed Flow/Typescript Prevents common errors, can enforce correct use of protocol API I Open challenge: can we enforce type abstraction for secrets
- Write and verify crypto/protocol/application in F*
 Compilers to C, JavaScript, WebAssembly
 Open challenge: formal guarantees for compilers and typechecker

Conclusion

- Many exciting research challenges in verifying cryptographic web applications
 - Typed sub-languages (WASM, Flow) help verification a **LOT**
- Additional language support would be a big help
 - Ask: Constant-time guarantees for WebAssembly
 - Ask: Enforce type abstraction in Flow
- Composing verified and unverified JS is a challenge
 - Ask: Link formal semantics of Wasm and JS